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I. INTRODUCTION
No matter what Professor Wesley Hohfeld said otherwise in one of
our more celebrated legal articles,' we still use the concept of rights
rather generically. We use "rights" to embrace without specification a
variety of legal relations. Perhaps we speak so loosely just for polemics.
There is a certain starch in the term "rights," and so we may spray the
word about just for its rhetorical force. Often we gain that force at no
cost. But then there are exceptions, one of which is a free-speech
knot-made by government "buying-up speech"-that we have yet to
untangle.
Properly, a right serves the individual; it preserves the autonomy and
dignity of a person.2 The right to speak, therefore, is a protected zone of
Simmons Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I am grateful to
Professors Akhil R. Amar, William Busbee, and Colleen Murphy for their useful com-
ments on drafts of this Article.
' Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
2 For a short review of the origins of rights, and how in these origins rights are
seen as protecting certain special spaces (commonly referred to as "zones" or "spheres")
of personal autonomy, see Brian Tierney, Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts
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personal choice. It is the individual's freedom to speak as he wills.3
For speech, this relation of rights has worked well enough in the tra-
ditional context of command and control regulation. In this context, there
is a clear division between the private and public sectors, with the pri-
vate sector-an area of autonomous and consensual actions among peo-
ple-being the rule and government intrusion the exception. When gov-
ernment does intrude, it is by an order. In the case of speech, a person is
commanded not to speak. The right to speak, though, countermands this
order so that the individual may speak as he chooses. Moreover, in this
context, the right to speak is aligned with the community's interest in
speech. As the individual's choice to speak is protected, the community
gains the speech.
But apart from command and control regulation in a growth ar-
ea-that of the activist state and a public sector that is about a third of
the national economy-the relation of rights has not been so helpful. To
the contrary, here this relation has accommodated government from time
to time as it arranges its various services and benefits to manage speech.
Some benefit or other is offered to a person, but only on the condition
that the person forego certain speech.4 In terms of rights, the catch is
that in this "conditional benefit" context, choice remains with the indi-
vidual.
A person may refuse the benefit and speak, or accept the benefit and
not speak. As the choice is hers, her "right" to speak is intact. In Rust v.
Sullivan,5 family health workers could either take federal money and not
and Contexts, 1150-1250, 10 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 615 (1989).
3 This zone of active and personal choices about speech is protected from measures
presumably for the collective good but nonetheless disagreeable to an individual. Free
speech is said to be a "conflict between the rights of a particular speaker as an individ-
ual and the competing interests of the community as a whole." Ronald Dworkin, Is the
Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49, 52.
4 Purchasing speech and ideological conformity by means of the allocational deci-
sions of government has reiterated throughout the second half of this century. Under
McCarthyism, public benefits were reserved to persons who refrained from
"unAmerican" activities. For instance, the employment of public school teachers was
conditioned upon those teachers refraining from subversive activities; that condition was
constitutional because those teachers retained the choice of working for the government
or "retain[ing] their beliefs and associations and go[ing] elsewhere." Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). More recent examples include: Lyng v. International
Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (regarding food stamps and labor picketing); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (regarding allocations respecting public
broadcasting editorials); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984) (regard-
ing financial assistance for educational institutions); Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (regarding lobbying).
5 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (5-4 decision).
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provide counsel about abortions or forgo the funds and speak as they
wished.6 This choice, they claimed, violated their "free speech rights."7
The Supreme Court, however, ruled otherwise, stating that no rights were
violated by government "offering that choice."8 Similarly, in Grove City
College v. Bell,9 the college argued that its "right" to continue its con-
servative academic environment was abridged by various conditions at-
tached to federally funded programs. The Court, however, noted that the
college could, if it wished, "terminate its participation in the ... pro-
gram." ° Therefore, the conditions in question violated "no First
Amendment rights.""
Just in terms of personal rights, these cases, I think, came to logical
conclusions, considering that in them the Court found that the right-
holders' autonomy had not been disturbed and thus no right had been
taken. The problem, however, is that in these cases government has un-
coupled and set at odds the right-holders' self-interest (which is served
by not speaking) and the community's interest in gaining the speech.
The courts do in fact sense this feature of free speech-how it serves
the whole community. 2 Further, they sense that in conditional benefit
cases, the state has intervened to separate and set at odds a speaker's
self-interest and the community's interest in speech. But while the courts
may sense this misalignment, rights-talk does not provide them with a
logical means of redressing it. The relation of rights identifies what a
person is at liberty to do, but it does not specify what ought to be
done. 3 The relation says nothing about whether a person should refuse
6 This condition was established by an administrative regulation promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services. 53 Fed. Reg. 2921 (1988). Health and Hu-
man Services administered the family health program, called the "Title X Program,"
that Congress had established. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1988). The Court granted certiorari to
resolve a split among the circuits concerning the constitutionality of the program. The
First and Tenth Circuits found the condition respecting speech to be unconstitutional,
while the Second Circuit had upheld it. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 & n.1.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 192.
8 Id. at 199 n.5.
9 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
o Id. at 575.
Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
12 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
But while the Court in these cases clearly recognized the communal value in free
speech, the Court at the same time tied the protection of this value to a relation of
rights. In both Pico and Virginia Pharmacy, the community's interest was recognized
only as a "corollary" of a personal right to speak. In both cases, the Court supposed the
existence of a "willing speaker," and then recognized a "right to receive information"
that existed as a "corollary" to this speaker's personal right.
"3 Professor Brian Tiemey has described this relation of rights:
1994] 375
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an offer against speech. More importantly, it says nothing about whether
the other party, the state, should make such an offer in the first place.
So, sited as it is amidst a misplaced discourse, the situation in the
courts, in speech and conditional cases, is about what you would expect;
it is at best confused. The situation, as Justice Blackmun has put it, is
that of a "troubled area of our jurisprudence." 4 A harsher assessment,
also delivered from the bench, is that the judgments in these cases are
the product of "idiosyncratic discretion." 5 The results do vary. Some-
times the condition that restricts speech is upheld by the courts, as in
Rust v. Sullivan. But then sometimes the condition is struck down. Al-
ways, however, the decisions seem incoherent, a medley of misplaced
epigrams (such as "no duty to subsidize a right") and dubious psycholog-
ical speculations (such as when choice becomes coercion). 6
As I see it, the cure for this disarray in First Amendment jurispru-
dence is not the usual one of trying to repair and upgrade the relation of
rights. 7 This is because the First Amendment is not just about a per-
A common theme in modem discourse on rights is the relationship between
rights and free choice.... According to this understanding of the term, a right
defines a sphere of licit action within which a person is free to exercise a power
or make a claim, free to act as he chooses .... "[R]ights are permissions rather
than requirements. Rights tell us what the right bearer is at liberty to do, not what
he must or must not do."
See Tierney, supra note 2, at 620-21 (quoting Robert B. Louden, Rights Infatuation and
the Impoverishment of Moral Theory, 17 J. VALUE INQUIRY 87, 95 (1983)) (emphasis
added).
"4 Rust, 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Scholars share this view of the
confused state of conditional benefit cases. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4, 6 (1988)
(stating that conditional benefits are "the basic structural issue that for over a hundred
years has bedeviled courts and commentators alike"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1416 (1989) (stating that conditional bene-
fit cases are "riven with inconsistencies").
" Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 238 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
16 The most recent line is that "when the government funds a certain view, the gov-
ernment itself is speaking." First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Leslie Southwich, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice); see Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amend-
ment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REv. 185, 201 (1992). As regards
choice becoming coercion, see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. As regards as-
sumptions about choice shading over into coercion, see infra notes 38-44 and accompa-
nying text.
7 Repair might be made by reconstructing the First Amendment around a concept of
inalienable rights. Inalienable rights cannot be traded according to the choices of the
376 [Vol. 3:2
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sonal right to speak. Instead, what the amendment primarily does is to
establish free speech as a common good. It identifies speech as a lively
thing among us that advances knowledge, politics, and culture to our
mutual benefit." More fully stated, the legal relation that the First
Amendment in fact establishes is: that (1) speech is a common good that
(2) government has "no-power" to limit. As the Constitution thus pro-
tects speech for the whole community, government cannot hope to limit
speech simply by buying-off some person or portion of the community. I
will of course discuss this proposition-its practicality and its deep his-
torical and textual support-more fully, but for now let me briefly state
its basis in constitutional text.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
holder, and so government cannot buy them with some benefit. This reconstruction
would not, however, seem to be well-advised. First, it is a paternalistic reconstruction
that vitiates the matters of autonomy and choice that are at the core of personal rights.
Second, in conditional benefits cases the reason for claiming that rights are inalienable
often has little to do with the individual right-holder and her interests. Rather, the rea-
son is that of avoiding the harm that may fall on the community at large because of the
choices of the right-holder. E.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1389 (1984). In this
context of community versus individual interest, the adjectives ("alienable" and "in-
alienable") alter the noun ("right") so much as to change it into two separate and dis-
tinct things. Here, alienable and inalienable rights are not just different kinds of apples;
rather, they are apples and cantaloupes. Overlooking this taxonomical difference produc-
es confusion. At least, this has been the case respecting free speech and active govern-
ment, and in the course of this Article I hope to show why.
Moreover, a right that is inalienable for the purpose of protecting the community is
not a right but a no-power relation. "[A]n inalienable right would ... be one which
incorporates both a disability and an immunity [the no-power relation]; the possessor of
the right would not be able to dispose of it, voluntarily or involuntarily, nor would any
other person, group, or institution be able to dispossess him of it." A. John Simmons,
Inalienable Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 177 (1983) (foot-
note omitted). There is thus no need to introduce confusion by designating some rights
as sometimes inalienable.
Another repair to rights-talk might be sharpening the coerced/free transfer distinc-
tion that is presently used in conditional benefit cases. This distinction, however, seems
beyond repair. See infra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
"8 Two recent articles, which are not necessarily of the same view of constitutional
text as presented herein, do, however, similarly view speech as a common good. Daniel
A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105
HARV. L. REv. 554 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100
YALE L.J. 2087, 2100 (1991) ("[T]he focus should be on the condition of public dis-
course, not the process by which the condition was created. Keeping ideas and informa-
tion from the public, not the unfair treatment of the speaker, is the gist of the constitu-
tional wrong.") (footnote omitted).
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abridging the freedom of speech."19 In these terms, free speech is rather
biotic, a thing apart and in being with a movement and direction of its
own. This energy is, as I take it, declared by the First Amendment to be
a common good (a "public liberty" in eighteenth century terms)" that
government lacks the power to abridge, either directly by orders or indi-
rectly by purchase. Later, this relation of no-power was extended, when
the states were made a party to it by the Fourteenth Amendment. As we
shall see, this extension was accomplished by a particular inversion of
language, by the Fourteenth Amendment's inclusion (in the Privileges
and Immunities Clause) of the "immunity" that is a "correlative" to no-
power.21
At this point, I probably have the burden of at least initially allaying
some doubts. First, you may question a reliance, as immediately above,
on a Privileges and Immunities Clause that case law has left dormant.22
There is, however, much evidence and fresh scholarship that shows that
this clause was (1) selected against a background of state suppression of
speech that contributed to the Civil War and (2) that this clause was then
dedicated to making the states party to the no-power relation established
by the First Amendment.23 Your second and more overreaching concern
may be that today any talk of no-power has to be archaic, considering
the overall demise of limited power in American government. But for
speech, I hope to identify how the relation of no-power can be, and in
fact has been, a useful form of analysis in the speech and conditional
benefits context. Thirdly, you may remember how the relation of rights
has in this century had a lion's share of the work of protecting speech,
19 U.S. CONST. amend I.
20 In correspondence in 1788 with Thomas Jefferson, James Madison distinguished
between common goods and individual rights, except that he used the phrase "public
liberty" rather than common goods. Madison wrote that proposals for a bill of rights
sought "further guards to public liberty & individual rights." Letter from James Madi-
son to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 20, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297
(Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
21 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 55.
22 That dormancy commenced in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873), in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause did not include an alleged right-the right to work-that had no positive
constitutional protection by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 78-79. For a discussion of the rela-
tion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to speech, see infra notes 121-41 and ac-
companying text.
23 See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). For evidence that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed to protect speech
from the states, see infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
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and you may be suspicious of anything that would diminish this work.
Still, the truth is that the First Amendment firstly establishes speech as a
common good. In relation to this good, the work of rights-working as a
legal relation under the First Amendment-has been instrumental. The
relation, as we said, protects the common good so long as the state acts
directly, by means of coercive orders. I do not at all argue against the
continuation of this work. Instead, I address a particular context where
rights have had a perverse relation to speech.
Finally, you may doubt the viability of any solution to the seemingly
intractable problem of conditional benefits. But I do not try to solve the
whole problem. Rather, I deal with a part of the problem, which is free
speech. Speech is of course a big part of the puzzle, but still it is only a
part, and one where the Constitution offers some specific and useful di-
rections. As well, case law shows that these directions-those of the no-
power relation-lend themselves to court enforcement. In short, in the
context of unconstitutional conditions, speech is a discrete problem with
a singular and viable solution.24
Below, I first of all outline-briefly and in relation to the work of
others25-how the relation of rights has failed speech. Secondly, I
somewhat summarily show how and why the Constitution has for speech
created a different relation of no-power. Thirdly, I discuss how judicial
review that is keyed to this relation of no-power should work.
II. AN ARBITRARY CALCULATION OF CONSENT
The relation of rights has served speech well enough, except in the
important set of government actions that is known as conditional bene-
fits. This section more fully describes how it is that here rights have not
worked so well for speech.
24 Conditional benefits-the matter of government buying-up speech-are but one
part of the whole free speech problem. Past this part, the remainder of the prob-
lem-which includes the substantive dimensions of free speech-will remain. These di-
mensions, of course, will remain as bewildering as ever, varying as they do over vari-
ous contexts such as politics, public schools, defamation, commercial speech, and so
forth. But perhaps these dimensions will not be so difficult, once we understand the
whole First Amendment and that it does not depend wholly on a relation of rights.
2 There is a considerable body of scholarship about conditional benefits. I have
found these works to be especially helpful: Epstein, supra note 14; Robert L. Hale, Un-
constitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935);
Kreimer, supra note 17; Sullivan, supra note 14; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right Privilege Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). I
hope to add a reorientation of the framework in which the various insights of this schol-
arship can be applied.
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As we said, a right is customarily justified by principles of personal
autonomy and dignity. As Joel Feinberg, a moral philosopher, explained:
Having rights enables us to "stand up like men," to look oth-
ers in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the
equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights
is ... to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to
be worthy of the love and esteem of others."6
An implication of this autonomy in rights is that they are alienable. They
can be transferred and traded according to the choice of the right-holder.
Moreover, by virtue of alienability, a right is worth more to its holder be-
cause alienability allows him to better himself. As explained by Judge (then
Professor) Easterbrook:
[P]eople sell their constitutional rights in ways that, they be-
lieve, make them better off...
One aspect of the value of a right-whether a constitutional
right or title to land-is that it can be sold and both parties
to the bargain made better off. A right that cannot be sold is
worth less .... 7
This view of the utility of alienability has a considerable pedigree. Rousseau
held that "all, being bom free and equal, surrender their freedom only when
they see an advantage in doing so."2 Hobbes explained:
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it
is either in consideration of some right reciprocally trans-
ferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for
thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of
every man, the object is some good to himself 9
So because of our respect for individual autonomy and our aversion to
denying an individual the chance to better herself, we generally hold that an
26 Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252
(1970).
27 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347.
28 JEAN-JACQUEs ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 51 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
1968).
29 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962).
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individual may trade her rights as she wishes3 -- but only as she wishes.
Rights may not be taken forcibly. In command and control regulation, the
state acts forcibly, and so here the relation of rights-as it guards against
coerced choices-works smoothly. Moreover, in the command and control
context, the right-holder's interest and the community's interest in speech
are, as we said, aligned. As the right-holder secures her choice (right) to
speak, the community gains the speech.
Unfortunately, there is no such beneficial alignment between personal
rights and the community's interest in speech in conditional benefit cases.
To the contrary, government may limit speech by buying-off the speaker
and may do so consistent with her right to speak, because her choice in the
matter-she has freely chosen not to speak-remains intact. Nevertheless,
the community is denied the speech, and in this way freedom of speech as a
common good is limited. This abridgment is the nub and the cause of anxi-
ety and confusion in conditional benefit cases. Courts may reason that
speech is a common good. However, in the terms they use-the convention-
al discourse of rights-courts cannot readily protect speech as such. Still,
the cases get decided, and "conditional benefits" are sometimes upheld and
sometimes not. Always, though, these courts speak of rights. And in this
discourse, they are unwilling to imperil the strong core of rights and the au-
tonomy of the right-holder by speaking of rights as inalienable.
So, how do courts deal with conditional benefits? If they do not like the
condition, they may overturn it, but on grounds that are at least nominally
consistent with alienable rights. They say that the right was not freely trad-
ed-that instead the right was taken according to pressure that amounted to
coercion." For instance, in Speiser v. Randall32 the United States Supreme
Court held that a property tax exemption could not be conditioned on the
property owner taking a loyalty oath.33 Justice Brennan explained this hold-
ing by saying in various ways that the offer of exemption amounted to coer-
cion:
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain
30 One may no-doubt think of circumstances, such as a consent to a police beating,
in which the consent of the victim does not excuse the act. In light of such circumstanc-
es, one may argue that some "rights" are inalienable. I would agree when the right at
issue concerns the well-being of the individual rather than that of society, as is the case
with the community's interest in speech. See supra note 17.
3" The idea that "[t]he power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power
to coerce" seems to have originated in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936),
to have survived Cardozo's withering criticism in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 585-86 (1937), and to thereafter have reiterated through a host of modem
cases.
32 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
3 Id. at 528-29.
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forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such
speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to
fine them for this speech .... [T]he denial of a tax exemp-
tion for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the
effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the pro-
scribed speech.34
Conversely, when a conditional benefit is upheld-as is often the case-the
courts simply say that the right was freely traded.
This distinction between free and unfree transfers of rights has a ring to
it. As the Court has said, "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free so-
ciety one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State. '35 However, this panegyric, soothing as it may
be, has not been all that successful. Not from the standpoint of reasoned
decisions in which judges put the cards on the table for all to see.36 Not
from the standpoint of consistency. The cases, as it has been said, are "riven
with inconsistencies."'"
One reason for this disarray is that the baseline against which the free or
coerced choice distinction is measured is subject to manipulation. Consider a
34 Id. at 518-19.
15 Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988) (quoting Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)).
36 In the context of speech and conditional benefits, Justice Scalia has explained that
the "requirement that judges write opinions providing logical reasons for treating one
situation differently from another' is a "restraint" on the ideological preferences of
judges and their tendency to "facilitate silencing" of the voices they disapprove. Arkan-
sas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 235 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1416. Professor Sullivan illustrated the inconsistency in
conditional benefit cases as follows:
Having held that using funding conditions to induce public broadcasters to segre-
gate editorializing activity would violate freedom of speech, the Court held that
using tax benefit conditions to induce nonprofit organizations to spin off their lob-
bying activities to a separate affiliate poses no similar infringement. Having held
that denial of unemployment compensation to Saturday sabbatarians unconstitu-
tionally burdens freedom of worship, the Court has rejected every other claim that
conditions on food stamps or welfare payments unconstitutionally burden rights to
speech.... And having held that the federal government may not use its spend-
ing power to pressure state governments into yielding constitutionally protected
autonomy, the Court has nevertheless rejected every federalism-based challenge to
conditions on federal subsidies since the New Deal.
Id. at 1416-17 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, the cases suggest that in the present loose
jurisprudence of conditional benefits, judges act according to their ideology to an un-
usual degree. Id. at 1417 & n.14; see Ragland, 481 U.S. at 235-238 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
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property tax exemption conditioned on a loyalty oath. If the baseline is a
world of no taxes, then a tax on persons who refuse to make the oath seems
like a penalty for disloyalty. However, if the status quo is a world where a
property tax is normal, then the exemption for oath-takers may seem like a
bonus for loyalty. In Speiser, the U.S. Supreme Court was of the former
view and the California Supreme Court of the latter.38
This baseline problem, though, is probably not the main problem in the
coerced/free transfers distinction.39 The main problem may be that the dis-
tinction carries with it a psychological measure that judges cannot reliably
make. This measure is that of motivation along a continuum, the point with-
in a person at which temptation shades over into coercion.4"
According to the Supreme Court, property-tax exemptions conditioned
on the recipient taking a loyalty oath'are coercive, while food stamps con-
ditioned on the recipient staying out of labor strikes are not.4 But what is
the difference between free choice and coercion in these two cases? The
Court's distinction was a flurry of words. Respecting the tax exemption, the
Court held that "[t]o deny an exemption ... is in effect to penalize [the
claimant] for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State
were to fine them for this speech."42 For food stamps and labor strikes, the
Court found that "[the condition] does not 'order' appellees not to associate
together for the purpose of conducting a strike ... and it does not 'prevent'
them from associating together or burden their ability to do so in any signif-
38 Compare 357 U.S. 513 (1958) with 311 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1957). In its relevant part,
the California decision incorporated its reasoning in First Unitarian Church v. Los An-
geles, 311 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1957). There the court reasoned that "[i]t is fundamental that
the payment of taxes ... is a uniform if not universal demand of government." Id. at
512. Does a denial of otherwise available tax exemptions to non-profit organizations
that lobby burden this political activity in violation of the First Amendment? Again, it
seems to depend on the baseline. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540 (1983), a majority of the Court chose as the baseline a society in which taxation is
the norm. Consequently, the tax exemption in question seemed to be a subsidy to the
majority.
" I have advanced a very simplistic view of the baseline problem. For a much more
comprehensive review of this problem in its various aspects, see generally Kreimer, su-
pra note 17.
40 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (stating that congressional
financial incentives may be so coercive as to pass the point where "pressure turns into
compulsion") (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590 ("[T]he point at which pres-
sure turns into coercion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of de-
gree.")).
41 Compare Speiser, 357 U.S. at 513 (holding that property-tax exemptions based on
loyalty oaths are coercive) with Lyng, 485 U.S. at 360 (holding that conditioning food
stamps on the recipient staying out of strikes is not coercive).
42 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518-19.
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icant manner. 4 3 You might think that the pressure between the benefit to
be gained and the speech to be given up was about the same in both cases
(or perhaps a little greater in the food stamps case). More likely, you would
think that the distinction could not reliably be made. The point is that these
and other cases show that judges do not, not convincingly or with convic-
tion, come to grips with the problem of locating the psychological point at
which temptation shades into coercion."
Further, the coerced versus free-transfer distinction sets up the "no-duty-
to-subsidize-the-exercise-of-a-right" argument featured in modem conditional
benefit cases.45 This argument was perhaps used for the first time in an
1836 congressional debate about closing the U.S. mail to anti-slavery publi-
cations. Proponents of the closure argued:
It was one thing to leave our citizens entirely free to print
and publish and circulate what they pleased, and it was an-
other thing to call upon us to aid in their circulation. From
the prohibition to make any law "abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press," it could never be inferred that we
must provide by law for the circulation through the post of-
fice of every thing which the press might publish.46
That argument was then dismissed because it was merely formal; it ignored
43 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 366.
" See Kreimer, supra note 17; Sullivan, supra note 14; Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 601 (1990).
With some precision, courts might say that choice becomes coercion when the
"choice" is, as Holmes put it, between "the lesser of two evils." Union Pacific R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918). This is a choice a person would rather
not have at all, as when a robber commands, "your money or your life." It is not pareto
perfect, because it leaves a person worse off. Conditional benefit cases, however, are
generally not in this rock and the hard place category. In a Speiser-type situation for
instance, a veteran might well prefer the choice of avoiding property taxes by taking a
loyalty oath, than no chance of tax exemption at all.
Even if a "lesser of two evils" choice is in fact present, the courts have not neces-
sarily overturned it as such. In Steward Machine, states were offered a choice between
paying a federal tax or establishing a system of social security. Steward Machine, 301
U.S. at 574-78, 585-93. For Alabama, that was a rock and a hard place. Nonetheless,
the Court upheld the "choice" because it was incidental to a national system of social
security, the establishment of which was within Congress's power and in the Court's
view a good use of that power. Id. at 585-92.
" E.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 ("[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exer-
cise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict
scrutiny.").
46 12 CONG. DEB. 1724 (1836) (Statement of Senator Buchanan).
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the real-world effect of a viewpoint-based closure of the only viable means
of a national circulation of speech.47 Today, however, this sort of argument
shows up in cases with good frequency, about as often as the coerced versus
free-transfers distinction of which it is a part.
The genuine appeal in the no-duty-to-subsidize-a-right argument is that
"passive," or "positive," rights are not the norm in our country. Government
generally has no obligation to underwrite rights by funding their exercise.4
But that truth is not useful in conditional benefit cases. Consider a situation
in which not-for-profit-organizations may either refrain from lobbying and
receive a tax break or lobby and not receive the tax break. A non-profit or-
ganization sues on the ground that this scheme violates its right to speak
freely. In this suit, a court, as it wishes, may characterize the scheme as one
involving free choice. If the court chooses the free-choice characterization,
then no right (the choice) has been taken. Since no right has been taken, the
court can view the plaintiffs case as essentially a complaint against the
government's failure to subsidize a right. Under this view, the plaintiff actu-
ally wants the money as well as the right,49 and plaintiff loses because gov-
ernment has no duty to subsidize a right.
The court, however, may instead find for the plaintiff merely by char-
acterizing the tax exemption as coercive. Now, by definition the right in
question has been forcibly taken and thus the "no-duty-to-subsidize-a-right"
clause is simply beside the point.5" Just so, in conditional benefit cases this
clause is usually an extension of the coerced versus free-transfer manipula-
tion. The clause, therefore, does not represent analysis, but instead stands as
camouflage for decisions already and otherwise reached.
These things I have so skimpily covered-a baseline problem, the co-
erced-versus-free-choice distinction, and its no-duty-to-subsidize-a-right vari-
ation-are part of the inconsistent and poorly explained decisions common
to conditional benefit cases. This unfortunate circumstance was predicted by
Justice Cardozo. At the dawn of the modem social-services state, he noted
that a rights oriented measure of the allocational decisions of government
would operate as an incoherent piece of "philosophical determinism."5
" See infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
48 E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) ("To translate [the right to
choose to abort a pregnancy] ... into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman . ").
4' For instance, in Rust the Court found that the case "ultimately boil[ed] down to"
the fact that the plaintiffs wanted both the government money and their opportunity to
speak for abortion. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
'o As Justice Scalia has explained, the reason there is no duty to subsidize a right is
that the "denial (of a subsidy scheme] does not, as a general rule, have any significant
coercive effect." Ragland, 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590.
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This forecast has been confirmed by several scholars"2 and from the bench
by Justice Scalia. In Arkansas Writer's Project v. Ragland, Justice Scalia
wrote:
I dissent from today's decision because it provides no ratio-
nal basis for distinguishing the subsidy scheme here under
challenge from many others that are common and unques-
tionably lawful. It thereby introduces into First Amendment
law an element of arbitrariness that ultimately erodes rather
than fosters the important freedoms at issue. 3
The arbitrariness that Scalia depicts is at least invited, and more likely as-
sured, by a misplaced relation of rights. If speech is a common good, what
difference does it matter to the community denied it that the speech was
purchased rather than mugged? The issue is not the form of transaction be-
tween the speaker and the government; rather, the issue is the
externalities. 4
III. THE TEXTUAL BASIS OF THE No-POWER GUARANTEE
The thesis herein is that the Constitution treats speech as a common
good and divests government of the power to abridge it. Because the Con-
stitution protects speech for the benefit of the whole community, govern-
ment cannot avoid that protection by buying-off one or more members of
the community. In this way, the otherwise imposing catch to conditional
benefit cases-that a person has freely traded his right to speak-becomes
irrelevant.
If substantiation of the inalienability of a provision for the common
good is necessary, it can be found in case law relating to the jurisdiction of
federal courts. At times, the question arises as to whether a party has waived
52 E.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 14; Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1416.
53 Ragland, 481 U.S. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' Perhaps the possibility of bad externalities may be dismissed by saying that the
transaction in conditional benefit cases is pareto perfect, and that the general welfare is
therefore necessarily advanced by these transactions. Since she consented to the deal to
advance her welfare, the individual who forgoes speaking is better off. The whole soci-
ety, on its part, may be said to have benefited; government has acted for its benefit in
the matter. So, both the individual and the whole society, through the agency of govern-
ment, gain. The problem, however, is in assuming that government in fact represents all
of us. Often there is not a homogenous public interest, but a variety of conflicting inter-
ests. Even if there were a homogenous public interest, government may imperfectly rep-
resent it. So, there is the problem of agency costs. In the context of speech, the judg-
ment embodied in the Constitution is that these costs are great enough to authorize a
withdrawal of government's power to act in the public interest.
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a right under Article III of the Constitution to a federal court adjudication.
In addressing this question, the Supreme Court has divided the judicial pow-
er of Article III into two parts. One part is a "personal right" to "an impar-
tial and independent [federal] adjudication."55 This personal right is
waivable, and may be given-up by the consent of the right-holder.56 How-
ever, another part of Article III consists of public functions that pertain to
the "role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of
tripartite government."'57 Because these "public functions" pertain to the
common good, they may not be waived by a party.5" Thus, the First
Amendment as it similarly serves the common good should similarly be
non-waivable.
Therefore, in speech and conditional benefit cases, courts should imme-
diately cut to the chase and examine whether and by what processes an en-
vironment of free-speech has been disturbed by government. But before dis-
cussing this method of judicial review, let us first examine the text and his-
tory that shows how the Constitution treats speech as a common good and
divests government of the power to abridge it.
A. Background
In 1787, the constitutional convention heard the motion that the docu-
ment be amended to declare that "the liberty of the Press should be inviola-
bly observed."59 But after an explanation that the declaration was not need-
ed because "[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the Press," the
motion was defeated.6 °
Following the convention, these premises about limited federal power
and speech were again explained-this time to the people in the crucial rati-
fication debates in the states. In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney explained
that the "liberty of the press" had been "fully debated" at the constitutional
convention and that the resolution of this debate was that "[t]he general gov-
ernment has no powers but what are expressly granted to it; it therefore has
no power to take away the liberty of the press."6 In Pennsylvania, James
" Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834 (1986).
36 Id. at 848.
57 Id.
58 "When these Article III [public function] limitations are at issue, notions of con-
sent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests
that the parties cannot be expected to protect." Id. at 851; see Insurance Corp. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 704 (1982). Regarding non-
waivability of First Amendment protections, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 676 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
59 II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 617-18 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
60 Id. at 618.
61 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 ELLIOT's DEBATEs 315 (1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE-
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Wilson explained that "there is given to the general government no power
whatsoever concerning [the press]; and no law, in pursuance of the Constitu-
tion, can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty."62 Even a strong Anti-
Federalist, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, had to "confess [that] I do not
see in what cases the congress can, with any pretence of right, make a law
to suppress the freedom of the press. 63
If this structural protection was already in place in the Constitution, then
why was the First Amendment added? First, the general idea of a bill of
rights had gained considerable popular support during the ratification de-
bates.' Second, some people feared that a speech protection based solely
on "inferences" from limited power was not the best that could be offered.
Such protection might be avoided by restricting speech by an enlargement
of an expressly granted power. "The Liberty of the Press," it was said, "is
not secured, and the powers of Congress are fully adequate to its destruc-
tion, as they... may by a cursed abominable Stamp Act (as the Bowdoin
administration has done in Massachusetts) preclude you effectually from all
means of information."65 Similarly, the Postmaster General was said to
BATES]. In North Carolina, James Iredell explained that "the future Congress will have
no other authority over [the press] than [in copyright].... If the Congress should exer-
cise any other power over the press than this, they will do it without any warrant from
this constitution, and must answer for it as for any other act of tyranny." PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 361 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1968) [hereinaf-
ter PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION].
62 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 61, at 449. During the ratification debates,
Wilson's remarks were widely read, having been reprinted in at least thirty-four
newspapers and circulated throughout the states. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
63 Richard H. Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer (Letter IV, Oct. 12, 1787), in PAM-
PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 316. Lee did, however, worry that
Congress might indirectly burden speech by imposing special taxes on it. Id.
In Virginia, the understanding that the proposed Constitution disabled the federal
govemment of power respecting speech was formally stated. There, Patrick Henry's
motion to make ratification contingent upon the addition of a bill of rights was defeat-
ed. Instead, the Constitution as it stood was ratified, by a resolution stating that "the
powers granted under the proposed Constitution are the gift of the people, and every
power not granted thereby remains with them, and ... liberty of conscience and of the
press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the
United States." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 61, at 653.
64 E.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
65 I PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 181 (John B. McMaster &
Fredrick D. Stone eds., 1970) (remarks of an Officer of the late Continental Army). In
New York, Melancthon Smith made a similar argument, contending that "by the indefi-
nite powers granted to the general government, the liberty of the press may be restricted
by duties, &c. and therefore the constitution ought to have stipulated for its freedom."
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 114. See generally Eric Neisser,
Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas, 74
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have abused the postal power by using it to restrict the distribution of news-
paper accounts critical of the proposed constitution. George Washington
complained of this postal action, and wrote that "[i]t is extremely to be
lamented, that a new arrangement in the post-office, unfavorable to the
circulation of intelligence, should have taken place at the instant when the
momentous question of a general government was to come before the peo-
ple. '
66
In corresponding with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson had argued that
a protection of important liberties based only on an "inference" from a limit-
ed powers structure was insufficient. 67 He suggested that for these free-
GEO. L.J. 257, 263-67 (1985) (contending that an express Bill of Rights was adopted to
prevent federal abuse of enumerated limited powers).
66 Letter from George Washington to John Jay (July 18, 1788), in II THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 290 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1891). The postal-power
problem had to do with the fact that in 1787 the Postmaster General directed that the
mail be carried horseback rather than by stage. XVI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 541 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. Unfortunately, this new
method of carriage disrupted and delayed newspapers at the peak of the ratification de-
bates. See id. The thought was that this disruption was a deliberate attempt by Federal-
ists to suppress bad news about the proposed constitution. Id. This view was expressed
in a satire, consisting of a supposed letter by "James de Caledonia" (which is how the
Anti-federalists referred to James Wilson) published in the Philadelphia Freeman's
Journal. "De Caledonia" fears that his appointment as Attorney General under the pro-
posed constitution is in peril because the constitution may not be ratified; however, this
fear, he says, has been somewhat mollified, considering that of late bad accounts and
bad news about the new constitution had been suppressed; as he explains:
I said that accounts from every quarter were against us; but this truth, my lord,
none, but about ten of us in the state know anything of; for we publish.., that
every thing is going on favorably elsewhere: and I find our system of decep-
tion ... has been of infinite service to us. And then our stopping all real intelli-
gence, by preventing the newspapers going backwards and forwards thro' the
Post-Office, has been a very necessary precaution.
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Otherwise, criticism of this perceived abuse of the postal
power was not so subtly expressed, as in "[t]ake the alarm all ye Lovers of Free-
dom .... The first symptom of a design on the liberties of America is the shackling of
the Press .... If the people submit to this conduct, nothing can rouse them from their
lethargy." Id. at 561.
67 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). Jefferson's reservations,
more fully stated, were:
I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing
clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the
press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eter-
nal and unremitting forces of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury .... Let
me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every gov-
ernment on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should re-
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doms "a brace the more" would be helpful.68 In 1789, Representative Mad-
ison went ahead and proposed the brace by means of the First Amendment.
A few years later, in Virginia's "Remonstrance" against the infamous Alien
and Sedition Act, Madison explained the amendment as well as anyone has:
If no such power [respecting speech] be expressly delegated,
and if it be not both necessary and proper to carry into exe-
cution an express power; above all, if it be expressly forbid-
den, by a declaratory amendment to the Constitution,-the
answer must be, that the federal government is destitute of
all such authority.69
B. The Text
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."70 Consistent with the
background concerns about an undue expansion or abuse of government
power, the amendment's "make no law[s]" phrase denotes a relation of no-
power.7' The object of this relation is "the freedom of speech." As previ-
fuse, or rest on inference.
Id.
68 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THE PORTA-
BLE JEFFERSON (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
69 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolution, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 61, at 573. The original understanding of the relation of the First Amendment to
the no-power structure of the Constitution was also explained in an essay by George
Hay printed in 1799:
The federal government had been organized, and its operation had commenced,
some time before the ... [First A]mendment became a part of the [C]onstitution.
During this period, the press was free, from any controul .... In this state of
things, a clause is added to the Constitution, which declares that the freedom of
the press shall not be abridged. In other words, the press shall continue to enjoy
that total exemption from legislative controul ....
George Hay, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1799), reprinted in GEORGE
HAY, Two ESSAYS ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 21-22 (photo. reprint 1970) (1803).
70 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71 In addition to the historical background described above, a certain matter of style
shows how the words "make no law" were chosen so as to denote a no-power relation.
As previously mentioned, the First Amendment was initially slated for insertion in Arti-
cle I as a limitation on national power. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
James Madison, for one, favored this placement, because he worried that the true con-
stitutional scheme might be lost were this amendment, and some others, placed at the
end as a separate bill of rights. As explained by Madison:
[The Constitution] will certainly be more simple, when the amendments are inter-
woven into those parts to which they naturally belong ... we shall then be able
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ously stated, this general phrase and its impersonal context seem to identify
free speech as a common good. Additionally, there are linguistic circum-
stances external to the text that support this reading of the freedom of
speech.
In terms of compacts and constitutions, the "freedom of speech" phrase
has a particular origin, which is in reference to parliamentary debate. In
1638, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut provided for "liberty of
spech" in that colony's assembly. In 1689, the English Bill of Rights pro-
vided "[tihat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parlia-
ment."73 These origins in a parliamentary environment-an environment
into which one comes by membership--prefigure the notion of a societal
environment of free speech, into which we enter by membership.74
Some additional support for reading the "freedom of speech" as a com-
mon good may be gleaned from a certain silence in the text. The amend-
ment does not specify the beneficiaries of the freedom of speech. Elsewhere,
the Bill of Rights is not so silent. The criminal law protections of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments are for individuals. The Fifth Amendment, for in-
stance, leads with "[n]o person shall be held to answer . . . ."" So, in the
silence of the amendment, to whom are we to understand that the freedom
of speech belongs? Does it belong to an individual (as a personal right), or
to the community, or to both?
The unexceptional reading of the First Amendment is that of assigning
"the freedom of speech" to the community. Prior to the First Amendment,
to determine its meaning without references or comparison; whereas, if they are
[separated], its meaning can only be ascertained by a comparison of the two in-
struments, which will be a very considerable embarrassment, it will be difficult to
ascertain to what parts of the instrument the amendments particularly refer; they
will create unfavorable comparison ....
James Madison, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 13, 1789), in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CON-
GRESS 118 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS]. For reasons of style, however, the First Amendment was placed at the end,
and outside of the body of the original Constitution. Had the First Amendment in fact
been placed within Article I, would there be any doubt (or the confusion that worried
Madison) respecting the no-power relation? Not likely.
72 FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF CONNECTICUT (1638-39), reprinted in THURSTON
GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION 801 (1991).
71 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (Dec. 16, 1689), reprinted in GREENE, supra note 72, at
801.
" To be sure, the move from free parliamentary debate to a general environment of
free speech, into which we enter by societal membership, is a large leap. However, as I
shall shortly discuss, there is some support for this movement in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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the state constitutions of Pennsylvania and Vermont provided for a "freedom
of speech."76 In both, the freedom of speech was identified as belonging to
"the people" 77-not to a person, but to "the people" collectively. Both con-
stitutions provided "[t]hat the people have a right to freedom of speech, and
of writing, and publishing their sentiments."78 Surely, "the people" are like-
wise the object-the unexpressed beneficiaries as it were-of the First
Amendment's assurance of a freedom of speech.79 As the freedom of
speech runs to "the people," it implies the common good previously de-
scribed-that is, speech that advances knowledge, politics, and culture to the
benefit of all.
Finally, in assessing the text of the First Amendment we turn to the
word that sets the margin between free speech and government. This word,
of course, is "abridging." In 1791 (and as now), "to abridge" meant "to con-
dense."8 The term was commonly used in publishing, as in the "abridged"
works of an author. According to this usage, the First Amendment injunc-
tion against "abridging the freedom of speech" means that government
should not attempt to limit or streamline a seemingly unruly environment of
speech. What speech works out to be, where it ends up, and how it gets
there, is a process that government may not abridge.
C. A Test Case
Early this century, the postal power was quite deliberately deployed
against dissenting political speech." This deployment was resisted by
rights-based arguments. These arguments, however, were smoothly deflected
and defeated with the rhetoric of conditional benefits. This rhetoric, as ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court, was that the "[t]he legislative body in thus
establishing a postal service may annex such conditions to it as it choos-
es."82 However, about forty years after the ratification of the First Amend-
76 GREENE, supra note 72, at 801-02.
77 Id.
78 Id. (first emphasis added).
79 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1146-57 (1991); John C. Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967,
972 (1993). In the First Amendment's third clause concerning "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble," U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added), "the people" are spec-
ified in a syntax indicating that "the people" are the object throughout the amendment.
Saying that freedom of speech runs to the people does not, however, necessarily
mean that speech is exclusively a common good because it makes sense to say that the
personal right to speak is left with "people."
80 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 43 (1st ed. 1970).
81 See DOROTHY G. FOWLER, UNMAILABLE 109-25 (1977).
82 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506 (1904); see also United States
ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921)
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ment, similar efforts to suppress speech via the postal power were defeated.
This limitation of the postal power was gained by means of a no-power
construction of the First Amendment.83
Some forty years after the ratification of the First Amendment, anti-slav-
ery activities had increased. "[F]erocious band[s] were in the possession of
ample funds and a powerful press, and for the first time that instrument had
been seized upon to be wielded against the peace of the South. '8 4 In 1835,
President Jackson moved against these publications. In his State of the Un-
ion address, he asked Congress to authorize the Post Office to refuse "trans-
mission through the public mails of certain publications of a dangerous ten-
dency." 5 Congress debated Jackson's proposal and then defeated it on
free-speech grounds.86
(discussed infra note 153); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). The
Lewis Publishing case, which is not precisely a seditious speech type of case, upheld
the Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 37 Stat. 539, 553-54
(1912), which required the public disclosure of a newspaper's ownership in order for
the newspaper to receive subsidized second class postage rates. This case and its history
are usefully reviewed in LINDA LAWSON, TRUTH IN PUBLISHING: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF THE PRESS'S BUSINESS PRACTICES, 1880-1920, at 85-90 (1993).
813 This debate about speech and the postal power, which is set out in the text above,
was the second large public debate respecting the correct interpretation and application
of the First Amendment. The first such debate was, of course, about the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts. A point of connection between these two debates was that both featured a no-
power construction of the First Amendment-a point that was not overlooked in the
postal power debate. Respecting the Alien and Sedition Acts, see 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 61, at 569-80.
84 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1836). In 1835, the Postmaster General
reported to Congress:
A number of individuals have established an association in the Northern and East-
ern States, and raised a large sum of money for the purpose of effecting the im-
mediate abolition of slavery in the Southern States. One of the means resorted to
has been the printing of a large mass of newspapers, pamphlets, tracts, and alma-
nacs, containing exaggerated, and, in some instances, false accounts . . . . These
they attempted to disseminate throughout the slaveholding States by the agency of
the public mails.
12 CONG. DEB. 3795-96 (1836).
8- CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1835). In his message to Congress, Pres-
ident Jackson stated: "I must also invite your attention to the painful excitement pro-
duced in the South by attempts to circulate through the mails inflammatory appeals ad-
dressed to the passions of the slaves ... calculated to stimulate them to insurrection,
and to produce all the horrors of servile war." 12 CONG. DEB. 1724 (1835). Jackson
then proposed "a law as will prohibit... the circulation in the southern States, through
the mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection." Id.
at 1725.
86 Some of the opposition to the bill was bipartisan, with southern legislators, such
as Senator Grundy from Tennessee, joining northerners in successful opposition. CONG.
GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1835). John C. Calhoun had managed to have the
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In the debate of Jackson's proposal, Congress first of all gave no curren-
cy to the idea that it was not speech itself, but rather its distribution, that
was at risk. Legislators understood the distribution of speech to be essential
to an environment of free speech. Senator Davis of Massachusetts, for in-
stance, explained that the "[Post Office] was designed by the framers...
for the dissemination of public intelligence ... for the dissemination of that
kind of general intelligence which was the foundation of a free govern-
ment." With the point made that free speech was at issue, the debate then
turned to whether the proposed legislation was consistent with this freedom.
In this part of the debate, legislators (at least those whose arguments pre-
vailed) did not speak of "rights." Instead, they inquired whether Congress
had the "power" to authorize the post office to refuse transmission of certain
publications. "[I]f it was conceded that the Government had not the power,
as suggested, then there was an end of the matter, and [the supporters of the
bill] must acquiesce."8
The argument that Congress did have the power was grounded in an
"implied power," derived from the commerce and postal powers. 9 Senator
Davis, however, explained that in the case of speech, Congress was divested
mail-closure bill routed to a special committee to consider the measure. Id. at 36. The
special committee's report equated circulation with publication, and concluded that the
proposed measure was an impediment to circulation that would abridge the freedom of
the press. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 347-48 (1836). Calhoun's own position
was somewhat more complex. He argued that the federal government did not have the
power to use the mails against disfavored speech, and, therefore, opposed the measure
proposed by President Jackson. Id. at 347. Calhoun, however, thought that the states
(against whom the First Amendment did not then run) did have the power to pass laws
against speech that might produce local violence. Id. at 348. He thought that the federal
government could, and should, accommodate this state power. For this, Calhoun man-
aged to have his committee recommend that local postmasters be directed to refuse de-
livery of mail of an anti-slavery content that was contrary to local law. Id. Calhoun's
measure, like Jackson's, was voted down in the Senate on free speech grounds. Still,
the states' rights theory of Calhoun eventually had some success by means of adminis-
trative fiat. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. See generally DONNA L.
DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF TOLERANCE: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 81-113 (1990) (discussing the contentious coexistence of slavery
and freedom of press to express anti-slavery sentiment); CLEMENT EATON, THE FREE-
DOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH 196-215 (1964) (discussing Southern
states' censoring of mail from Northern states that contained anti-slavery views).
87 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1836). In addition, Senator Niles ex-
plained that "circulation and publication were intimately connected; and to limit and
restrict the great public channel of circulation was to impair the efficiency of the press
by denying to it the only public facility of circulation provided by our laws." Id. at 352.
88 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1835) (remarks of Senator Preston).
89 John Marshall's expansive definition of the commerce power (in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)) was said to include "reciprocal communication[]."
12 CONG. DEB. 3803 (1836); see also id. at 1723 (regarding postal power).
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of its usual authority to imply power. "The liberty of the press," he said,
"was reserved in express terms; it could not be touched in any manner.' 9°
In other words, the general doctrine of implied powers-as otherwise vali-
dated in McCulloch v. Maryland"'-was not a viable theory of power un-
der the special no-power guarantee of the First Amendment.92
Finally, the issue that is today so troublesome in conditional benefit cas-
es was raised by several of the bill's proponents. No rights, they said, would
be taken because the bill was "not to restrain or punish publications ' and
the bill "in no way interfere[d] with the right of freely printing, publishing,
and circulating, at their own risk, cost, and responsibility, such arguments or
sentiments as [anyone] shall think most proper and expedient." 94 However,
if free speech was understood as an environment that government has no-
power to disrupt, that argument based on personal rights could not work; the
environment would be disrupted when government selectively subsidizes the
distribution of speech as allowed by the bill. And free speech was so under-
stood; in those debates the formalistic "no-rights-have-been-taken-because-
one-was-restrained" argument was inconsequential. Instead, Congress attend-
ed to the real-world consequences of a selective closure of the mails and to
whether it had the power to bring about those consequences.
95
90 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1836).
9' 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
92 In relation to speech and implied power, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying
text.
93 12 CONG. DEB. 1723 (1836).
9 Id. at 3807. A related argument offered in favor of the post office bill was that
the First Amendment created no "positive" rights. "From the prohibition to make any
law 'abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,' it could never be inferred that we
must provide by law for the circulation through the post office of every thing which the
press might publish." Id. at 1724.
Later in our history, this view of a postal power free of the First Amendment was
crystallized: "The legislative body in thus establishing a postal service may annex such
conditions to it as it chooses." Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506
(1904).
9' For example, Senator Niles objected to the likely bad effect of the proposed bill
on any sort of efficient circulation of printed materials:
What is the number of periodical publications in the city of New York? Probably
fifty or more of every description, many of them daily. They must all be exam-
ined before they can be lawfully forwarded, and of course time must be allowed
for the performance of this service. These are, most of them, of a miscellaneous
character, made up from other publications, and of course each paper must be
carefully examined in its entire contents, to see if it contains anything touching
the subject of slavery.
CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1836). Further, Senator Niles explained that
in fact the closure would generally disturb the function of the press because "circulation
and publication were intimately connected; and to limit and restrict the great public
channel of circulation was to impair the efficiency of the press by denying to it the only
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In its report on the mail closure bill, the Senate Select Committee ex-
plained that the "[First Amendment] withdraws from Congress all right of
interference with the press, in any form or shape whatsoever, '96 and that
"[a]fter the most careful and deliberate investigation," it was "constrained to
adopt the conclusion that Congress ha[d] not the power to pass such a
law."97 Prominent legislators such as Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and
even John C. Calhoun had spoken against the proposed closure, arguing that
it was a disruption of speech that was outside the power of Congress.98
Thus, Jackson's bill to close the mails to anti-slavery materials was defeat-
ed.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment
Of course, originally, the protection of the First Amendment ran only
against the federal government alone, and not the states. In relation to con-
ditional benefits, a protection so confined is not insignificant. The federal
government is the biggest player in the public sector and is therefore best
situated to manage speech through allocational conditions. Still, the states
too are substantial players, and thus they have ample opportunities to man-
age speech. Also, understanding why and how the states were brought into
the free-speech fold underscores how "the freedom of speech" should refer
to an environment of free speech and not simply to the rights of speakers."
public facility of circulation provided by our laws." Id.
These congressmen understood that a selective closure of the mails would have a
large impact on the content of speech. With regards to a "consequentialist approach" to
the problem of government benefits and free speech, see infra notes 186-200 and ac-
companying text.
96 12 CONG. DEB. app. 72 (1836).
97 Id.
" Id. at 1728-29 (Clay); id. at 1721-22 (Webster). Calhoun's position was somewhat
more complex than that of the others. See supra note 86.
9 For some time, free-speech history in this country, at least with respect to legal
scholarship has been abridged. This history starts with the 1791 addition of the First
Amendment, pauses at the Sedition Act of 1798, and then jumps a century or so, to the
period of World War I. Among other things, this abridged history leaves out such a run
of bad-tendency laws enacted by southern states, debates about closing the mails to an-
ti-slavery publications, and the free-speech background to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment's free-speech background, however, has been the subject of
recent scholarship. See CURTIS, supra note 23 (discussing whether the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to protect individuals from states limiting of rights); Amar, supra
note 23 (discussing relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). See generally DICKERSON, supra note 86 (discussing development of freedom of
the press); EATON, supra note 86 (discussing southern states' efforts at censoring anti-
slavery sentiments).
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1. The Un-Free Speech Background to the Fourteenth Amendment
The early 1860s produced some gloomy sessions in Congress, which
then sensed that "a dissolution of the Union is this day upon us."' 0 One
of the causes of the impending dissolution was thought to be an abridgment
of speech that had established the North and South as separate intellectual
environments. Bitterly, Senator Trumbull exclaimed that "the men who do
not allow our principles to be proclaimed in the South talk about sectional-
ism. A sectionalism, so pure ... that it will not tolerate the exposition of
the principles of its opponents at all where it is in power, talks to the other
party about sectionalism!"' 0' Senator Wade of Ohio said that lies had been
spread "where no antidote will be suffered to go .... They will suffer no
opinions to be circulated among them unless they are first cut and trimmed
to their own prejudices." ' 2
In comparison, when the Constitution was ratified, slavery had been a
matter of public debate. As late as 1832, emancipation enjoyed considerable
backing in the Virginia legislature. 3 The hope was that free speech would
expose slavery as immoral, impractical, and inconsistent with the self-inter-
est of the majority of Southerners-the working people, the small farmers,
craftsmen, and merchants. "Give us fair play," it was said, "secure to us the
right of discussion, the freedom of speech, and we will settle the difficulty
at the ballot box.''1°4
Religious and anti-slavery organizations reportedly had thirty thousand
dollars and the capacity to address one million tracts to the white working-
folk whose welfare had been argued in the 1832 emancipation debates in
Virginia. 5 The Ohio Anti-Slavery Convention sought "to effect the de-
struction of slavery ... by ceaseless proclamation of the truth upon the
whole subject ... by presenting facts, arguments, and the results of exper-
iment, establishing the superiority of free over slave labor."'0 6 The society
'0o CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1860) (Representative Hamilton of Tex-
as).
'01 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1859).
02 Id. at 141; see also CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE-
BATES OF 1858, at 290-91, 300 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958) (recounting Lincoln and
Douglas' views on slavery); EATON, supra note 86, at 335.
03 For an account of these debates, see Michael K. Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over
Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on
the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1113, 1124-28 (1993). See generally ALISON G. FREEHLING, DRIFT TOWARD DISSOLU-
TION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVERY DEBATE OF 1831-1832 (1982).
1'4 HINTON R. HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT 7
(George M. Frederickson ed., 1968).
o See supra note 84.
06 HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
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proposed to "circulate tracts and periodicals embodying [its] sentiments,
invoke the aid of the pulpit, [and] wield the power of the press." 107
The "power of the press," however, was never used as they wished. In-
stead, a curtain of suppression came down across the South." 8 This cur-
tain, as northern congressmen believed, was lowered according to the pull of
a minority: the 350,000 slave-owners among the "[s]ix million white men,
women, and children [of the South], who have to obtain their living by la-
bor."109 As explained by John Bingham, who would later be the principal
author of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It is the wealthy men of the South who have their invest-
ments iri slaves, who ostracize the friends of emancipation,
and oppose the system of protection to free labor. These gen-
tlemen apprehend that if free speech is tolerated and free
labor protected by law, free labor might attain in their midst
to such dignity and importance as would bring into disrepute
the system of slave labor, and bring about, if you please,
gradual emancipation, thereby interfering with the profits of
these gentlemen."'°
The suppression of speech came in various and sundry ways. Southern
states enacted "bad tendency laws" that criminalized speech that might un-
dermine slavery.' Public authorities condoned or ignored private acts of
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY", AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 172 (1968).
107 Id. at 173.
1 Speaking before Congress in 1860, Representative Bingham spoke of the curtain
that had been lowered:
Then, sir, Maryland tolerated open and active efforts among her citizens for the
abolition of domestic slavery. Then Kentucky tolerated like efforts for the aboli-
tion of slavery among her citizens; and Virginia saw and felt in every fiber of her
existence that she must either throw off that giant wrong or perish by reason of its
continuance.
And to-day, sir, to-day, it would cost a man his life to rise deliberately in the
Legislature of Virginia and announce a sentiment in favor of emancipation, such
as I referred to as having been announced by some of her most distinguished sons
in the memorable debate of 1832.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (1860); 'see supra notes 81-98 and accompa-
nying text.
'0' CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857 (1860) (remarks of Representative
Tompkins).
"o Id. at 1861.
Curtis, supra note 103, at 1133-34.
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suppression, such as the occasional hostile mob." A more serious sup-
pression was an administrative censorship by southern postmasters. As it
was said in Congress: "We have sacred guarantees in that instrument in be-
half of free speech, free thought, and a free press, and yet to-day Demo-
cratic postmasters rifle mails.""' You may ask how this postal censorship
could have occurred, when, as discussed earlier, Congress had flatly refused
to enact such a law. The censorship occurred because of a bureaucratic end-
around in which southern postmasters simply assumed the authority to re-
fuse delivery of anti-slavery publications. The theory offered in their support
was that the national government, and officials thereof, had to respect the
internal laws of the states. Southern states had "bad tendency laws" against
anti-slavery publications. Therefore, local postmasters were bound to review,
and then refuse delivery of, materials that they found to be in violation of
those laws."4 In any event, postmasters general who were sympathetic
Democrats simply overlooked the "rifling" of the mail by southern postmas-
ters.
Thus, before the fighting started, the disruption of a climate of free
speech had become a matter of grave concern. As it was then seen this dis-
ruption had spoiled any hope of getting at the truth of slavery by public de-
bate, and had fostered a searing division in the country. When the Civil War
was finished, the concern about speech was not. Part of the Fourteenth
Amendment was addressed to it. Senator Howard explained that the
12 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2598 (1860).
113 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1872 (1860). Senator Wilson complained that
"[t]here is not a [Republican] Senator ... who can send his frank into fifteen States of
this Union without subjecting his letter to be opened, examined, and destroyed." CONG.
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1859). Senator Wade explained that local postal ac-
tions had a disproportional impact on the Republican Party: "You will not suffer the
papers of a great and all-prevailing party in the North to circulate among you, so that
you may learn the designs of the party through that source which carries its intelligence
to the party in the North." Id. at 141.
"" This states' rights theory was set forth in an 1854 communication from the United
States Attorney General to the Postmaster General. In that communication, Attorney
General Cushing explained:
A deputy postmaster or other officer of the United States is not required by law to
become, knowingly, the enforced agent or instrument of enemies of the public
peace, to disseminate, in their behalf, within the limits of anyone of the States of
the Union, printed matter, the design and tendency of which are to promote insur-
rection in such State.
U.S. Department of Justice, Official Opinion of the Attorneys General of the United
States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in Relation to their Official
Duties, in FOWLER, supra note 81, at 38. Apart from considerations of states' rights, the
.flaw in this theory is that it provides administrative officials with a power to judge
speech, a power which, if it exists at all, ought to be placed elsewhere. See infra notes
151-64 and accompanying text.
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amendment's "first clause ... relates to the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States as such.""' These privileges and immunities,
Howard added, included "freedom of speech and of the press."' 16
More importantly, the Fourteenth Amendment was understood by its
ratifiers-the people in the country as a whole-as extending "the freedom
of speech" to the states. In a message to Ohio voters on the proposed
amendment, that state's governor explained that the amendment protected
the "immunities" of American citizens; the necessity of this protection had
been
proven ... long before the war, when it was notorious that
any attempt to exercise freedom of discussion in regard to
the system which was then hurrying on the rebellion, was
not tolerated in the Southern States; and the State laws gave
no real protection to immunities of their kind, which are the
very essence of free government.'
In Iowa, a newspaper explained that "[t]he privileges and immunities...
are those of not having your private letters opened and read by emissaries of
the oligarchy to ascertain your sentiments ... of not having your political
sentiments regulated by the same absolute authority.""' In a letter printed
in the New York Tribune and reprinted nationally, a southern unionist pro-
claimed:
The rights of American citizens, not only to enjoy their
rights, but to protection in the full enjoyment of them, is
now the dogma of the hour. At last it is to be asserted that it
is the paramount duty of the government to protect its citi-
zens in the full enjoyment of all constitutional rights, among
which are the right to free speech." 9
Representative Allison explained to his constituents in Iowa that "[i]f any
man asks me if I want the Constitution as it was and the Union as it was, I
tell him, No. I want a Constitution and Union where free speech is possi-
"' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
116 Id. "The great object of ... this amendment," Bingham added, "is ... to restrain
the power of the States." Id. at 2766.
17 CURTIS, supra note 23, at 147. The following instances, in the text above, of how
the Fourteenth Amendment was understood as extending the freedom of speech to the
states are all taken from Professor Michael Curtis' account of the ratification debates.
"I Id. at 144.
"9 Id. at 132.
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ble."'2° And so it went in the ratification debates.
2. The Text of the Fourteenth Amendment
A reading of the culture and politics that produced the Fourteenth
Amendment shows that this amendment was then understood as assuring a
truly nation-wide environment of free speech. This assurance was included
in the amendment's "Privileges and Immunities" Clause.
The terms of this clause are that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Unit-
ed States."'' As its ratifiers contemplated,"' and as Justice Black once
said, these terms are "an eminently reasonable way" of extending the First
Amendment to the states."2 But for some odd reasons, the Due Process
Clause has instead been thought of as the part of the Fourteenth Amendment
that assures this protection.' "Process," though, means procedure. Thus,
an "incorporation of rights" via the Due Process Clause has produced the
oxymoron of "substantive due process" and the redundancy of "procedural
due process." Apart from these aesthetic slights, there are other rea-
sons-grounded in history, structure, and linguistics-for supposing that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is the better means of incorporation of
substantive liberty.'25 Certainly it is for speech. For speech, the Privileges
120 Id. at 144.
121 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
122 See generally CURTIS, supra note 23, at 57-91 (arguing that the Bill of Rights was
adopted to guard against abuse by limiting powers of government); Amar, supra note
23, at 1218-59 (discussing whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights).
123 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); see also
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (voiding ordinances restricting dissemination of
information in public places without permit); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117-
18 (1908) (affirming that state exemption from compulsory incrimination is not secured
by Federal Constitution). But see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614-16 (1900) (al-
lowing states to determine size of juries for non-capital criminal cases). A good back-
ground discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and protects personal
liberties is provided by WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT CASES AND
MATERIALS 55-69 (1991).
'24 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("[W]e may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States.").
25 These reasons are developed below. There are, perhaps, differing consequences in
using privileges and immunities rather than due process to assure substantive constitu-
tional protections. For instance, as Professor Van Alstyne has explained, the Due Pro-
cess Clause has a broader coverage in that it pertains to persons while the Privileges
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and Immunities Clause more clearly aligns the Fourteenth Amendment with
the First Amendment.
The clause follows the form of the First Amendment: compare "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States"'26 with "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'2  This similarity is not co-
incidental. Both amendments were written with the limited power structure
established by Article I of the Constitution in mind. In its no-power form,
the First Amendment was originally drafted for insertion in Article I as a
limitation on power, and was only later placed at the end of the Constitution
as a separate amendment. 2 ' The form of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause was similarly drawn from Article I and its provisions limiting power.
Representative John Bingham, the author of the clause, explained:
As [the framers] had said "no State shall emit bills of credit,
pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligations of contracts;" imitating their example and
imitating it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment as it stands in the Con-
stitution, as follows:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the
United States .... 129
As Bingham referred to it, the Privileges and Immunities Clause complet-
ed-by a reiteration of a meaning of citizenship-the relation of no-power.
and Immunities Clause only pertains to "citizens." VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 123, at
63-65. An alien is a person but not a citizen. Thus, he would be able to assert a legally
enforceable liberty to speak under the Due Process Clause, but not under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. Id. This may be so if speech, however, is seen as a common
good to which citizens are entitled, then a citizen could sue, claiming that hearing what
the foreigner had to say was a privilege she enjoys under the Privilege and Immunities
Clause. This is how I view the listener's "freedom of speech" identified by the Supreme
Court. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (explaining in a Fourteenth Amendment case that "[flreedom
of speech presupposes a willing listener. But where a speaker exists ... the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both").
126 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
127 Id. amend. I.
,28 I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Its purpose and the
text, however, remained the same. See Amar, supra note 23, at 1199-1200; see also
supra note 71.
129 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871); see Amar, supra note 23, at
1218-20.
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In this regard, Professor Hohfeld has shown that "immunity" correlates to
"no-power."'3 For citizens, therefore, immunity means "not subject to" the
power of the states. 3'
Perhaps more profoundly, the origins of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause reveal a sense of national citizenship that makes the clause a natural
vehicle for the extension of an environment of free speech to the states. The
clause seems to have been first used in 1606 in the Charter of Virginia. That
charter provided that Virginians would "HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Fran-
chises, and Immunities ... as if they had been abiding and borne within
this our Realm of Englande.'' " For another one hundred and seventy
years, similar clauses were used in organic laws of the various colonies,"'
as an empire-wide guarantee of the liberties of the English. The word
"rights" was not commonly used in these guarantees. Perhaps that term was
then reserved, at least in precise legal usage, for specific and interpersonal
relations-now referred to as "claim-rights"-that people might create
among themselves by contract. 34 Thus, instead of "rights," the Privileges
and Immunities Clause seems to have referred to a set of "constitutional
limitations" to which the crown had positively acceded. Professor Michael
Conant, in his study of the clause's origins, concluded that "[1]egal-linguistic
history .. . demonstrates that [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] was a
synonym for constitutional limitations."'35 Particularly, "[t]he word immu-
130 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 55.
3 I have emphasized "immunity" because its position as a correlative to no-power
supports the thesis of this Article in the ways that I have discussed above. There is, of
course, another noun, i.e., "privilege", in the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Possi-
bly, this word adds nothing to the meaning that the word immunity infuses into the
clause, and perhaps the word privilege is best seen as a filler, used to round out the
clause. In common usage, privilege has denoted a special and advantageous relation.
Consistent with this usage, privilege seems to have been used in a promotional sense;
the privileges and immunities clause in colonial charters was an attempt to assure Eng-
lishmen that in moving to the colonies they did not lose the various advantages of Eng-
lish government. As privilege denoted a special advantage it connoted special people,
and thus it came to be used as a boast. Just so, Madison collapsed liberty into privilege
when he spoke of "[t]he freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest
privileges of the people .... " 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1028 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
132 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS 3788 (Francis N. Thorpe, ed. 1909).
133 GREENE, supra note 72, at 602-10.
'34 See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 103-04 (1968). Also, a reservation of the word rights
to claim-rights is consistent with the Hohfeldian matrix because only by immediate and
personal consent, as in a contract, could the rather pointed "duty" that is the correlative
of a right be reasonably created. See Simmons, supra note 17, at 177.
131 Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth
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nity, when used in the context of the relationship of citizens to government,
meant exemption. It designated... the citizens' freedom from the legal
power of government to act on some topic. "136
Out of these origins, the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporates a
Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 829-30 (1982).
In discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, I have passed over Corfield v.
Coryall, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D Pa. 1823), and the well-known dicta in that case that
would anchor the phrase "privileges and immunities" in a concept of natural rights. Id.
at 551-52. Here, I agree with Professor Conant that the origins of the clause show that
it was not meant to incorporate an indeterminate range of natural rights but to instead
signify a set of liberties established by compact, as in the Magna Carta. See Conant,
supra, at 817. The English were too practical and contract- or compact-minded to de-
pend on looser natural-law notions. Cf I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: RIGHTS OF PERSONS 119 (1st ed. 1765). In writing about
personal liberty, Blackstone spoke of natural rights, but noticed that "their establish-
ment ... [is] still human." Id. at 123. He then proceeded to discuss these liberties that
had been arrived at by compact, such as the Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights.
Id.
After the American Civil War, this distinction between natural law and privileges
and immunities as established by compact was known and acknowledged. In 1866, Con-
gress debated a statutory provision that would establish national citizenship and pre-
clude "discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the citizens of the United
States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866). In explaining this act, Repre-
sentative Rogers of New Jersey distinguished between "the rights of nature" and "the
privileges and immunities created and granted to citizens of a country by virtue of the
sovereign power under which the citizen lives." Id. at 1122. The Congressman's point
was that because the privileges and immunities that the proposed act contemplated
would alter the federal compact, they had to be established by constitutional amend-
ment. See id.
Modem case law has discarded the natural rights view of Corfield. Corfield in-
volved a construction of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Con-
stitution, which pertains to discrimination by a state against out-of-state residents.
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. In Corfield, the court noted that surely this clause could not
be interpreted to require equal treatment of non-residents and residents in all respects.
Id. at 552. The problem was how to distinguish between permissible and impermissible
treatment. The distinction the court drew was in relation to "fundamental" liberties
which included natural rights. Id. at 551. This distinction, however, did not help the
plaintiffs. The discrimination against non-residents was a reservation of oyster beds for
state residents. Id. at 550. The court, however, found that the discrimination was a legit-
imate conservation measure. Id. at 552.
In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984), the modem Supreme Court did not follow the natural rights dicta of Corfield.
Instead, the Court explained the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as fol-
lows: "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality
of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresi-
dent, equally." Id. at 218.
136 Conant, supra note 135, at 809.
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principle of national citizenship,137 and for citizens establishes a uniform
set of exemptions-throughout the republic-from certain governmental
powers. 'In ratification debates, the amendment was explained as aspiring "to
cement the [entire] Union, [so that] any of us can go into any State in the
Union with the declaration 'I am an American citizen' with the same con-
sciousness of protection as of old it was sufficient for any citizen of the
Roman empire to say 'I am a Roman citizen."''' So, with a sword of citi-
zenship and a shield of associated immunities, the Fourteenth Amendment
assailed the incomplete environment of free speech that slavery had re-
vealed.
I have read the First and Fourteenth Amendments as primarily establish-
ing speech as a common good rather than a personal right. An objection to
this reading may be that down through the years speech has been spoken of
as a personal right, and so that was how free speech was primarily under-
stood. True, speech is, and has been, commonly spoken of as a right. In
Civil War debates, for instance, Representative Lovejoy "claim[ed] the right
of discussing this question of slavery anywhere, on any square foot of
American soil over which the stars and stripes float."'39 Here, Lovejoy
used the word "right" in the correct context of personal liberty and free-
choice. Sometimes, however, the word is used in a conflated context. Sena-
tor Sumner, for example, said that slavery "can be sustained only by a disre-
gard of other rights, common to the whole community, whether of the per-
son, of the press, or of speech."' 40 The rights Sumner referred to are com-
munal as well as (perhaps) personal. Other times, "right" is used in only a
communal sense. For instance, the suppression of speech that had contribut-
ed to the Civil War was described as "unsuited to the genius of this govern-
ment, which is based on the right of the people, to a free and full examina-
tion of whatever concerns their interest and happiness."' 4 The point is that
talk off the pages of the Constitution may be often about speech and rights.
In the more considered text of the Constitution, however, the terms are of
speech and no-power.
... The Fourteenth Amendment attends to national citizenship right away, in its first
sentence it provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are
citizens of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138 CURTIS, supra note 23, at 143 (quoting BRATTLEBORO RECORD AND FARMER,
Nov. 3, 1866, at 1 (statement of Representative Woodbridge of Vermont during the
Vermont Fourteenth Amendment ratification debate)).
'9 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 205 (1860).
140 Id. at 2595.
141 Curtis, supra note 103, at 1127 (quoting portions of the 1832 emancipation debate
in Virginia).
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IV. THE METHOD OF A No-POWER FORM OF REVIEW
The First Amendment guarantees the freedom of speech as a common
good and the Fourteenth Amendment extends this guarantee by making the
states a party to it. Under the terms of these amendments, the freedom of
speech guarantee is secured by a relation of no-power. This section discuss-
es how this guarantee and the no-power relation that secures it can be
cashed in, in the courts.
In the courts, the no-power relation avoids the disconcerting finesse
common to conditional benefit cases. This finesse, of course, is that if to
achieve some greater good for herself a person chooses to accept a benefit
and to forego speaking, then courts cannot sensibly say that her right to
speak has been taken. But once the Constitution is understood as identifying
speech as a common good, the matter of rights and personal choice-keyed
as it is to the self-interest of the speaker-is beside the point.
Past this finesse, how might a jurisprudence attuned to a no-power rela-
tion work? It ought to work. Lest we forget, in Marbury v. Madison' the
virtue of a "limited powers" mode of review was the cornerstone of the
Court's assumption of the great power of constitutional review."' Of
course, the limited-powers structure on which Marbury was founded has in
many parts been blown. Still, speech is a special part, where the no-power
construction is "braced" by the "shall nots" of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Besides, a no-power form of judicial review has indeed sur-
vived for speech. Elements of it are alive in the cases, albeit sometimes
misplaced under the heading of rights.
Some of the elements of a no-power mode of review are presented be-
low in a hopefully more useful taxonomy. The part that will likely strike
most people as the most interesting is the substantive part which directly ad-
dresses the real-world consequences of a condition respecting speech. Before
reaching matters of substance, however, a court will consider equally impor-
tant matters of form and process.
A. The Form of Power
Especially in the context of speech, government power should be
properly deployed and channeled so as not to slop over and onto protected
speech. Therefore, judicial review includes familiar proscriptions against
142 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1802).
43 After describing the basic limited-powers structure of the Constitution, John Mar-
shall wrote that "[t]he distinction between a government with limited and unlimited
powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are im-
posed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation." Id. at 176-77.
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vague or overly broad statutes. Also, review of how power is deployed in-
cludes a "clear-statement rule."'" According to this rule of strict construc-
tion, courts presume that lawmakers take the First Amendment into account
and do not intend to abridge speech unless an intent to do so is stated in
language that bears no other construction.
Correct form also requires a generality in laws affecting speech.' 45 For
instance, subjecting the press to a general sales tax is one thing, subjecting
it to an uneven sales tax is something else. The uneven tax has a disparate
effect upsetting to a free market in speech. In Arkansas Writers Project, Inc.
v. Ragland,'4' a state sales tax offered exemptions to some parts of the
press but not to others. Under a rights-oriented approach, this tax might
have been upheld, by characterizing the exemptions to it as a "form of sub-
sidy" and then reciting that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."' 47 The Court,
however, did not act so nominally. Instead, it identified a flaw in the form
of the statute, a lack of generality, that stood to have real world consequenc-
es. The flaw was that "the Arkansas sales tax scheme treats some magazines
less favorably than others."'4 By uneven tax rates, the state stood to create
"a mix of publications different from the one that would have arisen under
either a tax-free world or one with a uniform tax on all types of publica-
'4 E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
,4 Some of the cases previously considered, such as Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958) and Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988), fail, or should
have failed, the generality test. In these cases, benefits were not generally disbursed.
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 362. Instead, specified forms of expression
established an ineligibility. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 362.
In the text above, generality is explained in terms of market consequences-the
ways in which uneven laws can upset markets so as to disadvantage speech. Generality
also has an unhealthy effect in terms of legislative process. This effect was described by
the Supreme Court:
When the State imposes a generally applicable [burden or denial of benefit], there
is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government will destroy a se-
lected group ... by burdensome [imposition] if it must impose the same burden
on the rest of its constituency. When [a] State singles out the press, though, the
political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of gen-
eral applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome [denials] becomes
acute.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (citations omitted); see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.").
' 481 U.S. 221 (1986).
... Id. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 229.
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tions."' 49 In light of that disparate impact, the Court held the sales tax
scheme unconstitutional. 5
B. The Placement Power
In 1945, the Supreme Court addressed a problem, the Post Office's habit
of withholding good rates from disfavored speech, that had festered for
years. In Hannegan v. Esquire,5' the Post Office Department had revoked
the subsidized and inexpensive second-class mail privileges that Esquire
magazine had enjoyed. In the Department's view, Esquire was too racy "to
contribute to the public good and the public welfare."' 52
Taking a path marked by Brandeis and Holmes,'53 the Court in
Hannegan overturned the Department's action. That action, the Court found,
amounted to an improperly placed "power of censorship." Censorship was
not a power that an agency such as the Post Office could by itself assume.
Rather, if this power could be exercised at all by administrative officials, it
had to be on the basis of a precise delegation of authority from Congress.
The Court explained: "To uphold the order of revocation would, therefore,
grant the Postmaster General a power of censorship. Such a power is so ab-
horrent to our traditions that a [congressional] purpose to grant it should not
"I Epstein, supra note 14, at 76.
"0 Ragland, 481 U.S. at 234.
15' 327 U.S. 146 (1945).
52 Id. at 150.
... United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). In this case, the Post-
master General had revoked the second-class postal rates of a newspaper because of its
editorial position against United States intervention in World War I. The "tendency" of
these editorials was to impede war efforts. Id. at 414. In substance, this bad-tendency
test had then been approved as constitutional. Id. at 411. Holmes, however, would have
found that the action of the Post Office was nonetheless unconstitutional. Id. at 438
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes objected to the agency action on the grounds that the
Postmaster General lacked the authority, explaining that "it would take very strong lan-
guage to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically despotic
power to any one man." Id. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting). That was as far as a judge
needed to go. As Holmes explained, "[t]herefore I do not consider the [substantive] lim-
its of ... constitutional power." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Speech and the placement of power was also at issue in the 1836 congressional
debates about closing the mail to "incendiary" anti-slavery publications. See supra notes
81-98 and accompanying text. Senator Ruggles explained the "great difficulty was in
the postmasters determining what publications were interdicted by law, and what were
not," CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1836), and Senator Niles noted that the
proposed bill "confers on a deputy postmaster, a mere ministerial office, Federal pow-
ers; and requires him to decide questions of the most difficult and delicate character."
Id. at 352.
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be easily inferred."' 5 4 Thereafter, the Court read the relevant statutes strict-
ly, according to the "clear statement rule" described above. As read, the
postal statutes did not carry the authority that the Post Office had
claimed.'55
This exclusive placement in Congress of a power respecting speech
makes sense. Relative to agencies, Congress is constituted so as to be re-
sponsive to the range of values and interests implicit in speech.'56 Con-
gress is also burdened with serious decision costs, which require a high
level of deliberation and agreement before speech is infringed.' Adminis-
trative agencies, however, cannot be counted on to be responsive to values
such as speech. Ordinarily, their officials narrowly focus on a particular
program or policy, and cannot reasonably be counted on to be sensitive to
broadly gauged values.'58 Censors in the Defense Department, for instance,
can be counted on to be sensitive to national security, but not so sensitive to
competing values of speech.
The proper distribution of power between Congress and administrative
agencies was at issue in Rust v. Sullivan,'59 and that issue should have
provided a bright-line resolution of the case. Since 1970, when Congress
established the "Title X" program, subsidies to family health centers had
been dispensed without a "no abortion counseling" stipulation. In 1988, the
Department of Health and Human Services changed this policy by means of
an administrative regulation. 6 ° Had Congress delegated this power respect-
ing speech, or had the agency more-or-less assumed it? Certainly Congress
had not clearly authorized the action. The Supreme Court had to "agree with
every court to have addressed the issue that the [statutory] language is am-
biguous."16' Further, the Court explained that "[a]t no time did Congress
directly address the issues of abortion counseling."'62
To this (at best) ambivalent delegation of power, the Court did not bring
'5 Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 151. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the Court
narrowly construed the power delegated to immigration officials to condition the receipt
of passports on the political affiliations of the applicant. If that sort of action was per-
missible at all, it was "pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Id. at
129.
' Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 152.
156 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
' William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Ar-
ticle I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 948, 953-57.
"' See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
159 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
'6 53 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1988).
16' Rust, 500 U.S. at 184.
162 Id. at 185.
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to bear the rule of strict construction established by Hannegan and subse-
quent cases. Instead, the majority selected a deferential form of review, one
which tends to uphold agency action where Congress has been "silent or
ambiguous." This mode of review, was described by the majority:
The Secretary's construction of Title X may not be disturbed
as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction
of the plain language of the statute . . . . In determining
whether a construction is permissible, "the court need not
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
could permissibly have adopted ... or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen
in a judicial proceeding." '63
Such deferential review, while perhaps appropriate in conventional admin-
istrative law cases, is inappropriate in free-speech cases.'64 By means of
this review, the Court conceded an agency power to manage speech, when
precedent had established that such power is unconstitutionally placed.
C. Legislative Process and Germaneness
Congress may not have a power over speech, but it has other powers
such as the commerce power,'65 the postal power,'66 and so forth. Condi-
tional benefits often bundle conditions on speech with some other legitimate
governmental power. May Congress get at speech indirectly by a condition
incidental to these other powers? Generally speaking, since McCulloch v.
Maryland67 established a liberal doctrine of implied powers, courts do not
concern themselves with indirect assumptions of power. Nonetheless, speech
is a special case, and a particular purpose of the First Amendment is to
guard against indirect assumptions of a power respecting speech.
When the question whether the unamended Constitution sufficiently pro-
tected speech was first raised, the first answer, as we said, was that the lim-
163 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
64 This deferential form of review of administrative decisions was highlighted in
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Chevron, however, did not at all implicate the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the dissent in Rust would not have followed Chevron and
would have required instead a clear statement by Congress of the agency's power to
prescribe the speech-condition. Rust, 500 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
, Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
167 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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ited-power construction of the Constitution adequately protected speech. 6
The only powers the federal government could claim were denoted in Arti-
cle I, and speech was not among them. The skeptics, however, were not
mollified by this answer. Among other things, they feared that the
Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause would allow Congress to get at
speech indirectly, by a measure appurtenant to some express power.'69
When he introduced the proposed bill of rights to Congress, James Mad-
ison spoke of this concern: "[S]ome of the State Conventions seemed to en-
tertain an opinion that ... the clause of the constitution, which gave power
to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper [to express powers] en-
abled them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of
conscience."'70 The cure for this concern was to specify-by the "Con-
gress shall make no law" lead to the First Amendment' 7-that govern-
ment had no power respecting speech.
This disability, calculated to limit indirect assumptions of power respect-
ing speech, ought to exempt speech from the general doctrine of implied
powers. In the case of speech, courts should not routinely defer to implica-
tions of power and should instead try to carefully limit such indirect as-
sumptions of power.' In fact, one means of such a limitation is presently
in place. It is a requirement of "germaneness" that has percolated through
the cases. This requirement is based on the argument, most recently stated
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that "conditions on [a] federal grant[] might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national
168 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
I70 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 128, at 758. Madison explained to Congress:
It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed, they are direct-
ed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it has
certain extraordinary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse
to a certain extent .. because in the constitution .. there is a clause granting to
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper ....
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 82. The actual instances of suppres-
sion of speech about which concerns were expressed during ratification debate were of
a misuse of the express postal power and power to tax. See supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text.
'7' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' This doctrine, as established in McCulloch, assumes that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is not a limiting but an enabling clause. According to McCulloch, the clause
authorizes an implication of power where "appropriate" to carrying out a denoted pow-
er. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 356. Moreover, a legislative determination that an implied
power is appropriately derived from an express power is (virtually) unreviewable. Id. at
378-79. The context of McCulloch, however, was economic and financial-whether
Congress had the power to establish a national bank-and in that context there was no
specific limitation of power as the First Amendment. Thus, McCulloch ought not to be
controlling in the quite different case of speech.
1994]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
projects or programs."" 73 In a previous synthesis of conditional benefit
cases, Justice Frankfurter had concluded that the measure in them was
whether "the conditions imposed are fairly related to ... interests which
[the state] may appropriately protect."' 74 Earlier still, Justice Cardozo had
used the same measure, by asking whether conditional benefits were "unre-
lated in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy
and power.""'
By means of germaneness, courts excise conditions unrelated in subject
matter to the power to which they are tied. A loyalty oath (to assure ideo-
logical conformity) is not of the same subject-matter as a property tax (reve-
nue), and thus the oath ought not to be tied to the tax.'76 In contrast, pub-
' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
"' Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp.,, 348 U.S. 66, 82 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
'71 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1936).
176 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Another instance of how germane-
ness might be (but was not) used to limit implications of power respecting speech is
provided by the facts of Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). That
case concerned the Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 37
Stat. 539, 553-54 (1912). The act required newspapers to publicly disclose their own-
ership as a condition to gaining subsidized second class mail rates. Id. at 553-54. In
Congress, the act was considered necessary because it was "just as important for the
public to be protected from false news, as for it to be protected from impure foods, and
there is just as much justification for requiring a paper to carry the names of its owners,
as for requiring that a can of fruit shall bear the name of the concern that packed it."
LAWSON, supra note 82, at 81. Before the Court, the newspapers argued that "[e]very
newspaper, magazine or periodical has the right to express its opinion no matter who
owns it or influences it and to deny it this right, either directly, or indirectly ... is in
contravention of the Constitution." Id. at 86-87. In particular, the newspapers argued
that the disclosure of ownership requirement was not germane to the power (the postal
power) that Congress had claimed. Id. at 87-88. Disclosing ownership did not make it
any easier to deliver newspapers by mail, and in fact, the Post Office had opposed the
Act. Id. As stated by the newspapers, "'[c]an it be possible that what Congress could
not do directly it may nevertheless accomplish indirectly by the pretense that such su-
pervision is necessary in order that the Post Office Department may suitably carry on
its important function?"' Id. at 87 (footnote omitted). The Court, however, did not ad-
dress this argument. It found it unnecessary to do so inasmuch as the government was
merely conditioning a benefit, the second-class mail privilege, stating: "When the ques-
tion is thus defined its solution is free from difficulty." Lewis Publishing, 229 U.S. at
308.
A recent application of germaneness (albeit not in the context of speech) is provid-
ed by Supreme Court decisions limiting the power of government to restrict land use.
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission had con-
ditioned its grant of a permit to rebuild a house on the owner's granting a beach access
easement to the public. Id. at 828. The Court found that the condition and the building
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lic employment has, on grounds of germaneness, long been conditioned on
foregoing certain speech. In 1882, in its second significant opinion concern-
ing free speech, the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Curtis.. re-
viewed an act that precluded political contributions by one federal employee
to another. At issue was whether this was an unconstitutional restriction of
political expression. The Court upheld this issue from a standpoint of power
and germaneness: "The evident purpose of Congress ... has been to pro-
mote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to main-
tain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within
the just scope of legislative power."'' On into modern times, the courts,
when shown that a condition respecting speech is germane to a public job,
have similarly upheld the condition.'79 In contrast, when the condition has
not been germane, courts have tended to strike it down 80
permit were unrelated and held that the condition amounted to an unconstitutional tak-
ing of property. Id. at 838. "It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property re-
duces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house." Id.
177 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
.8 Id. at 373.
"' In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946), the Court again found
that restrictions of the political activities of civil servants were relevant to a legitimate
power of Congress. Id. at 99. In upholding the Hatch Act, the Court explained:
Another Congress may determine that, on the whole, limitations on active
political management by federal personnel are unwise. The teaching of experience
has evidently led Congress to enact the Hatch Act provisions. To declare that the
present supposed evils of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to
redress would leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men be-
lieve is a material threat to the democratic system.
Id.
In the context of public employment, germaneness also qualifies a famous, and oth-
erwise abrupt, statement of the privilege doctrine by Holmes: "The petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Holmes
qualified this statement by explaining that "[t]here are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as
well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract," and that "[t]he servant cannot
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same
principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its
control." Id. at 517-18. Here, Holmes may be read as simply explaining that govern-
ment can impose germane ("reasonable") conditions respecting public employment.
Holmes seems to be suggesting that private employment markets-the kinds of condi-
tions used by private employers-provide a relevant measure of germaneness in public
employment. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 67.
"0 E.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). In this case, Republican employees,
who were non-policy-making employees at the Cook County, Illinois sheriffs office,
were discharged when a Democrat was elected sheriff. Id. at 350. The Court found that
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A virtue of "germaneness" is that it may infuse some logic into an ap-
parent truism that is still used and misused in conditional benefit cases:
"Even in the law," it is said, "the whole generally includes its parts."''
The apparent truism, then, is that the greater power must include the less-
er. 82 Thus, a power such as the power to tax may be taken as including a
lesser power such as differential taxation-or so it would seem. However, as
Professor Powell years ago explained, "the greater includes the lesser" ap-
proach amounts to a bad syllogism. 8 3 Under this approach, a conclusion,
e.g., differential taxation, may include a term, "differential," that is not ex-
pressed in the premise, taxation. This illogic has real-world consequences. A
tax applicable to some newspapers but not to others produces an effect, a
distortion in the markets that produce speech, that is additional to and apart
from the effect of a general tax. The "greater includes the lesser" approach
can, however, be infused with some logic by requiring that a greater power
be germane to the lesser power. If the lesser power-the condition on
speech-and the greater power are so related, the conclusion will no longer
contain terms or represent effects that are so apart from the premise. 84
these acts of patronage violated the First Amendment because patronage was not suffi-
ciently germane to job performance:
It is argued that employees of [different] political persuasions ... will not have
the incentive to work effectively and may even be motivated to subvert the in-
cumbent administration[] . . . . We are not persuaded. The inefficiency resulting
from the wholesale replacement of large numbers of public employees every time
political office changes hands belies this justification. And the prospect of dis-
missal after an election in which the incumbent party has lost is only a
disincentive to good work. Further, it is not clear that dismissal in order to make
room for a patronage appointment will result in replacement by a person more
qualified to do the job since appointment often occurs in exchange for the deliv-
ery of votes, or other party service, not job capability .... [I]t is doubtful that the
mere difference of political persuasion motivates poor performance ....
Id. at 364-65. Germaneness, though, is not the courts' only measure of the legitimacy of
restraints respecting the speech of public workers. Courts have inquired whether the
employee speech was about a matter of "public concern," Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 140 (1983), and have employed a high burden of justification in order to restrain
such speech. E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Van Alstyne,
supra note 25, at 1440-41.
s' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
'82 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-47 (1989)
(explaining that the greater power to ban gambling includes the lesser power to limit
advertising of gambling); see Kreimer, supra note 17, at 1304.
"' Thomas R. Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 99, 110-
11 (1916).
'" Accordingly, Professor Hale in his classic commentary on conditional benefits
explained that if the greater did include the lesser, then the lesser had better be ger-
mane. Hale, supra note 25, at 349.
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Germaneness may sift out conditions unrelated to governmental interests.
But because of the expansive power of modem government there remain
many possibilities of connection between speech and related government
interests. Too much, then, should not be claimed for germaneness. Still, the
range of conditions that government might tie to dissimilar interests is sig-
nificant. In this range, germaneness ought to create healthier politics. A re-
quirement of relevance limits logrolling by requiring separate votes for dis-
similar acts. Certainly, "[v]ote trading can occur even when separate votes
are taken on each issue, but separating the two votes makes ... logrolling
deal[s] much riskier."'85 In the speech context, separating votes would
make the deal even riskier because the legislature would be more clearly
exposed as operating in the face of the Constitution's "shall nots."
D. The Consequence is the Measure of the Condition
First Amendment process assures that a condition respecting speech is in
a proper form, germane to a legitimate governmental interest, and produced
by a competent institution. Given the special status of speech, however,
these matters of form and process are not enough." 6 They may be neces-
sary, but they are not sufficient.
The First Amendment also pertains to substance, which substance entails
a climate of free speech. This being so, the substantive investigation re-
quired by the First Amendment necessarily includes an inquiry into the ef-
fect, in the bright world around us, of a condition respecting speech. As
stated by Holmes, "[t]he consequence is the measure of the condition."'87
An attention to consequences should eliminate the inattention to reality
that has been a disappointing feature of conditional benefit cases. These cas-
es do not usually ask "has the action in question changed speech, the kinds
'85 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REv. 873, 904 (1987).
116 Apart from judicial review, these matters-the generality principle, the clear state-
ment rule, and the rule against vague or overly broad statutes-are all clear enough
standards to be useful ex ante in lawmaking. Legislators can know that in actions af-
fecting speech they cannot offer benefits unevenly based on the views of the recipients.
They can also know that in relation to speech, they are bound by drafting rules that re-
quire a particular clarity and precision.
187 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 54 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). There is, of course, a running debate about whether the impro-
priety in an act should focus on the intent behind the act or its consequences. For
speech, however, the First Amendment seems to have resolved the debate on the side of
consequentialism. If the First Amendment assures a climate of speech unmanaged by
government, then it makes no difference that government has some sort of good motive.
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of speech or publications that would prevail absent government interven-
tion?" For instance, in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson,'88 the Milwaukee Leader's second-class mail "privileges" had
been revoked because of its editorial opposition to United States involve-
ment in World War .89 By using "the greater includes the lesser" ratio-
nale, the Court upheld the Postmaster's action. Because Congress had a
"plenary power" over postal services, "the power to suspend or revoke such
second-class privilege was a necessary incident to the power to grant it."' 90
How was speech affected by denying the cheaper, subsidized postal rates
to a newspaper? Here, the majority opinion is silent. However, Justice
Brandeis dissented, writing that "[t]he Constitution deals with substance, not
shadows. Its inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the name. '19 The
shadows were a misplaced discourse of rights. The substance was in the
consequences of the action in question. The subsidized rates, available to
newspapers with correct political views and denied to those with incorrect
views, gave the former a competitive advantage. The rates, therefore,
"abridge[d] seriously [the] freedom of expression."'92
This sort of analysis often requires that courts pay attention to markets
in speech, and to how those markets are disrupted by government ac-
tion. "'93 And they have done so. In a number of cases, such as Arkansas
Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland,94 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 95
and CBS v. United States,96 the courts sensibly assessed various markets
in speech and how these markets were changed by government intru-
sion. '97
88 255 U.S. 407 (1920).
189 Id. at 408-09. The revocation was at the hands of the Postmaster General, who
had determined that this editorial opposition tended to undermine the war effort. Id. at
412.
"9 Id. at 410.
191 Id. at 431 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (footnote omitted).
'9' Apart from markets, an effects-oriented inquiry would look at a number of things,
such as a simple redistribution of wealth in favor of one viewpoint or the other. For
instance, in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the "selective tax exemption ...
result[ed] in a redistribution of wealth ... from those who [were] unwilling to sign the
oath to those who [were]." Epstein, supra note 14, at 75. Likewise, in Rust, an effects-
oriented review would have been more concerned that taxpayer money was redistributed
in favor of those who accommodated a government-prescribed view about abortion. See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
'- 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (commercial magazine).
195 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (subsidized television).
196 316 U.S. 407 (1942) (radio networks).
'9 The CBS case is not an unconstitutional conditions case. However, the Court was
required to, and did, assess the consequences in the broadcasting market of an action
that the Federal Communications Commission had claimed was without present effect in
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An additional feature of a consequentialist form of review is that it
shows the error in a particular modem approach to conditional benefit cases.
Under this approach, the activities of the recipient of a benefit are divided
into public and private parts. Government may control the public part, so
long as the recipient may speak in his other private sphere. As explained in
Rust v. Sullivan:
[Clinic] employees remain free, however, to pursue abortion-
related activities when they are not acting under the auspices
of the Title X project. The regulations ... do not in any way
restrict the activities of those persons acting as private indi-
viduals.'98
Just so, the Court seems to imagine distinct public and private
spheres-with the private sphere producing the information suppressed in
the public sphere. In contrast to that image, compare the more realistic ap-
proach of Oliver Wendall Holmes in Leach v. Carlile.99 In that case the
issue that concerned Holmes was this: because Congress has the discretion
whether or not to establish the post office and offer postal services, may it
therefore offer this discretionary service free of First Amendment con-
straints? Holmes thought not. In this respect, he explained:
The decisions thus far have gone largely if not wholly on the
ground that if the Government chose to offer a means of
transportation which it was not bound to offer it could
choose what it would transport; which is well enough when
neither law nor the habit that the Government's action has
generated has made [it] the only one. But when habit and
law combine to exclude every other it seems to me that the
First Amendment in terms forbids such control .... '00
that market.
The general viability of a consequentialist inquiry in conditional benefit cases has
been demonstrated by Epstein, supra note 14. In areas other than speech, where courts
actively assure that a power is not improperly assumed, the courts also use a
consequentialist form of review. Under the Commerce Clause, the courts examine the
effect of a state act to assure that it does not improperly burden national commerce.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The normative standards that define
"commerce among the states" are both derived from constitutional text and from evolu-
tion. E.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
198 Rust, 500 U.S. at 198-99.
258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 141.
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Holmes calculated according to the world as it is. Congress had established
a postal service that had displaced private carriers. Therefore, as the postal
service denied mail service to a speaker it operated as a practical censor re-
specting that speaker. In Rust, the same real-world view likely would have
shown that government had established a certain position in family health
care and that this position limited the number of wholly private health-care
sources that might otherwise produce abortion information.
V. CONCLUSION
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect speech as a common
good and this protection is afforded by a relation of no-power. Government
is disabled, and we enjoy an immunity, respecting speech. For speech, an-
other relation, the customary one of rights, is also useful as it is instrumen-
tal to protecting speech as a common good. In conditional benefits cases,
however, the relation of rights is not so instrumental. In these cases courts
should, therefore, fall back to the primary relation, the no-power relation,
that is denoted in the First Amendment.
In conditional benefit cases, the relation of no-power results in a form of
judicial review that is at once direct and more consistent with the idea of
freedom of speech. This idea, as embodied in the Constitution and as it has
evolved, is that of a prevailing climate of free speech. The courts' work in
tending this environment is complex enough as it is. Necessarily, the free-
dom of speech spreads across differing sectors such as political, literary,
sexual, defamatory, or commercial expressions and various spaces such as
schools and streets. In these different places the climate of speech varies,
and there is no reason to make the courts' work more difficult by an inapt
use of rights. In this respect, I would like to close with the caution-that an
inattention to the greater constitutional structure might be invited by an at-
tention to rights-that was sounded during original debate. A bill of rights,
it was then said, might amount to "a mere ignis fatuus [fool's fire], amusing
by appearances, and leading often to dangerous conclusions."' '
201 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 82.
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